

1 What Should I Be When I Grow Up? Occupations and  
2 Unemployment over the Life Cycle\*

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5 **Abstract**

6 Why is unemployment higher for younger individuals? We address this question  
7 in a frictional model of the labor market that features learning about occupational  
8 fit. In order to learn the occupation in which they are most productive, workers  
9 sample occupations over their careers. Because young workers are more likely to be  
10 in matches that represent a poor occupational fit, they spend more time in transition  
11 between occupations. Through this mechanism, our model can replicate the observed  
12 age differences in unemployment which, as in the data, are due to differences in job  
13 separation rates.

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# 1 Introduction

Labor market outcomes differ greatly for individuals of different ages. Unemployment rates are much higher for the young than for all others. For example, in the U.S., the unemployment rate for individuals aged 20–24 years old is approximately 2.5 times that of prime-aged individuals aged 45–54 years old; the unemployment rate of 25–34 year olds is about 50% greater than that of 45–54 year olds (see also [Shimer \(1998\)](#) and the references therein). As we discuss in Section 2, these differences are accounted for solely by the declining age profile in the job separation rate, the rate at which individuals transition from employment to unemployment. Moreover, age differences in separation rates are also large. For example, the separation rate for 20–24 year olds is approximately four times that of 45–54 year olds.

Though these age differences are well known, surprisingly little quantitative work has been done to account for them in the context of an equilibrium labor market model. In this paper, we present a model that focuses on differences in the separation rate. In our quantitative analysis, we find that the model does a good job of accounting for age differences in unemployment. The model also sheds light on the low-frequency evolution of aggregate unemployment experienced in the U.S., and rationalizes findings regarding wage dynamics discussed in the influential literature on job displacement (see, for instance, [Kletzer \(1998\)](#) and the references therein). Finally, the model replicates important empirical features of job mobility over the life-cycle that are at odds with models that rely on heterogeneity in match-specific productivity to generate age differences in unemployment.

In Sections 3 and 4, we present and characterize our model, a life-cycle version of the search-and-matching framework of [Diamond \(1982\)](#), [Mortensen \(1982\)](#) and [Pissarides \(1985\)](#) (DMP, hereafter). The key life-cycle feature that we introduce is learning on the worker’s part about her best occupational fit. Specifically, young workers enter the labor market not knowing the occupation that they are most productive in. We call this occupation the worker’s “true calling.”

In order to learn her true calling, a worker must sample occupational matches over her career. Upon entering the workforce, a worker searches for her first job in an occupation. Upon meeting a vacancy, a match is established. Over time, the worker and firm learn whether the current occupation is the worker’s true calling. If it is not, the worker-firm pair can either maintain the match or choose to separate. Upon separation, the worker seeks employment in a new occupation, having ruled out the previous occupation as being her true calling. As the worker samples more occupations and accumulates knowledge about her occupational fit, the probability of finding her true calling rises.

1 Match formation, learning, and separation are stochastic in our framework. As such,  
2 *ex ante* identical individuals experience different histories over time, as they move in and  
3 out of unemployment, and learn, more or less quickly, about their true calling. Despite this  
4 heterogeneity, workers can be summarized simply by their *type*: lower type workers have  
5 little information about their true calling, while higher types are closer to discovering it.  
6 Hence, the model generates an endogenous mapping between type and age.

7 This mapping allows us to address the differences in unemployment between young and  
8 old workers. Since lower type matches are more likely to turn out to be bad matches, they are  
9 more likely to endogenously separate. Thus, lower type workers—who tend to be young—  
10 experience higher unemployment rates, as they are more likely to be in transition between  
11 occupations. As documented by [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2008\)](#) and shown in the next  
12 section, this emphasis on the age profile of occupational mobility is highly supported by U.S.  
13 longitudinal data.

14 In Section 5, we study our framework’s quantitative implications. The model does a  
15 very good job of replicating the observed age profile of unemployment. This is because our  
16 model nearly replicates the declining age profile of separation rates observed in the data. In  
17 addition, our model does a good job of matching the age profile of occupational mobility.

18 In Sections 6 and 7, we consider two applications of our model. We first demonstrate  
19 that accounting for labor force aging enables the model to rationalize a significant portion  
20 of the fall in aggregate unemployment observed in the U.S. since the mid-1970s. We then  
21 illustrate how a simple extension allows the model to rationalize the heterogeneous responses  
22 of earnings and wages to match separations, as documented in the empirical literature on job  
23 displacement. Hence, taken together with the results in Section 5, we find that the “learning  
24 about occupational fit” mechanism is important for understanding a number of key features  
25 regarding life-cycle and aggregate labor market dynamics.

26 Our paper is not the first to emphasize the role of occupational fit in a labor market  
27 search framework. Our framework is related to the one-sided search problem studied by  
28 [Neal \(1999\)](#), in which employment relationships have two components: “career” quality and  
29 match quality. One interpretation of our model is that individuals are searching for a career  
30 by sampling occupations. As such, our model is consistent with [Neal \(1999\)](#)’s empirical  
31 findings that career change falls with labor market experience. However, since [Neal \(1999\)](#)’s  
32 model abstracts from unemployment as a labor market state, it does not address the age  
33 profile of unemployment rates, our subject of principal interest. More recently, [Papageorgiou](#)  
34 [\(2014\)](#) also studies learning about unobserved occupational ability in a search framework.  
35 However, because the phenomena of interest are different, a number of model features differ.

1 Papageorgiou (2014) finds that a calibrated version of his model does well in accounting for  
2 life-cycle wage dynamics, residual wage inequality, and inter-occupational flows. By contrast,  
3 our paper studies the role of learning about occupational fit in accounting for the life-cycle  
4 profile of unemployment and separation rates, as well as aggregate unemployment dynamics.  
5 Both papers do well in accounting for the life-cycle pattern of occupational mobility.

6 Finally, learning about occupational fit is not the only mechanism that can address age  
7 differences in unemployment in a frictional labor market model. Jovanovic (1979) represents  
8 a seminal contribution to the literature on endogenous job separations. In that model, a  
9 worker’s separation rate falls with tenure in a match. Since productivity in a match is  
10 stochastic and observed imprecisely, longer tenured matches are those in which the worker  
11 and firm have learned that idiosyncratic match quality is high. Menzio et al. (2015) illustrate  
12 how this mechanism generates a declining age profile of separation in a life-cycle model:  
13 since old workers have drawn more matches, they are more likely to be in ones with higher  
14 idiosyncratic productivity, and hence, less likely to separate.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, separation rates  
15 in our model fall as workers accumulate knowledge about their occupational fit, a form of  
16 human capital acquired through labor market experience. In Section 8, we discuss the key  
17 distinctions between these two mechanisms and, specifically, how our model rationalizes facts  
18 regarding job mobility and separation over the life-cycle that the match-specific productivity  
19 mechanism cannot.

## 20 **2 Data**

21 In this section, we detail the empirical observations that motivate our work. We first doc-  
22 ument large age differences in unemployment. We then present evidence on job finding  
23 rates, separation rates, and occupational mobility that informs our theoretical approach in  
24 Section 3.

25 We begin with the unemployment rate disaggregated by age, obtained from the Current  
26 Population Survey (CPS) for the period June 1976–November 2012.<sup>2</sup> The first row of  
27 Table 1 displays the average unemployment rate for different age groups. Unemployment

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<sup>1</sup>Finally, see also Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2014). In their model, older workers are assumed to be better able to observe idiosyncratic match productivity, and hence, reject poor matches before they are formed. In this way, their model generates a declining age profile of separation by construction. See also Gorry (2016) for a one-sided search model in which labor market experience provides a worker with better information about future match quality.

<sup>2</sup>We focus on this time period since this is the period for which micro-level data (used in the following subsection) is available. None of our substantive results regarding age differences are altered when data from 1948 to 1976 are included.

1 falls monotonically with age: the average unemployment rate for 20–24 year olds is 10.45%  
2 and falls to 4.01% for 55–64 year olds.

3 *[TABLE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

4 Moreover, the age differences are large. The second row presents the average unem-  
5 ployment rate for each age group, relative to that of 45–54 year olds. During this period,  
6 average unemployment for 20–24 year olds is 2.48 times that of 45–54 year olds. The average  
7 unemployment rate for 25–34 year olds is 51% greater than that of the prime-aged.

## 8 **2.1 Job Finding and Separation Rates**

9 What accounts for these large age differences? To address this question, we examine the  
10 age differences in job finding and separation rates. Consider a simple labor market model  
11 where: (a) all unemployed workers transit to employment at the constant rate  $f$ , and remain  
12 unemployed otherwise, and (b) all employed workers transit to unemployment at the constant  
13 rate  $s$ , and remain employed otherwise. In this setting, the steady state unemployment rate,  
14  $u$ , is given by:

$$u = \frac{s}{s + f}.$$

15 Holding  $f$  constant across age groups, a decreasing age profile for unemployment would  
16 require a decreasing profile for  $s$ . Holding  $s$  constant across age groups, a decreasing age  
17 profile for unemployment would require an increasing profile for  $f$ .

18 We first calculate job finding and separation rates following the approach of [Shimer](#)  
19 [\(2005\)](#). This approach is well suited for our analysis, since it assumes that all workers transit  
20 solely between states of employment and unemployment, as in the statistical model discussed  
21 above, and the economic model presented in Section 3. The approach uses monthly data  
22 on employment, unemployment, and short-term unemployment tabulated from the CPS.<sup>3</sup>  
23 Disaggregated by age, this data is available beginning in June 1976. Panel A of Table 2  
24 displays average transition rates by age during this period.

25 *[TABLE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

26 The first row of Table 2 indicates that job finding rates decrease monotonically with age.  
27 In the average month, 39.54% of unemployed 20–24 year olds transit to employment, a rate  
28 that is about 40 percent greater than that of 45–54 year olds. This difference is small when  
29 compared to separation rates, as discussed below. Moreover, absent differences in separation  
30 rates, age differences in job finding rates would counterfactually imply an *increasing* age

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<sup>3</sup>We refer the reader to [Shimer \(2005\)](#) for further methodological details.

1 profile for unemployment.

2 Hence, age differences in unemployment are accounted for solely by differences in separa-  
3 tion rates. The second row of Table 2 indicates that the separation rate falls monotonically  
4 with age. Moreover, the age differences are large. For example, the separation rate for 20–24  
5 year olds is 4.0 times that of 45–54 year olds. As such, the declining profile of separation  
6 rates is integral to any theory of age differences in unemployment.<sup>4</sup>

7 The Shimer (2005) approach to computing transition rates assumes that workers do not  
8 transit in and out of the labor force, though such flows are observed in longitudinal data.  
9 This may give rise to misleading conclusions, particularly if transition rates in and out of  
10 the labor force differ sufficiently by age. Panel B of Table 2 displays average transition rates  
11 measured from data on individual-level labor market flows. We use the longitudinal aspect  
12 of the monthly CPS files to track transitions across states of employment, unemployment,  
13 and labor force non-participation.<sup>5</sup>

14 The first row of Panel B presents the transition rate from unemployment to employment.  
15 This falls monotonically with age, with the job finding rate of 20–24 year olds about 20  
16 percent greater than that of 45–54 year olds. Again, these differences alone would imply  
17 an increasing age profile for unemployment. The second row presents the transition rate  
18 from employment to unemployment. As before, this falls monotonically with age, and the  
19 differences are large. The separation rate for 20–24 year olds is 2.7 times that of 45–54  
20 year olds.<sup>6</sup> Again, this indicates the critical role of separation rates in understanding age  
21 differences in unemployment.

## 22 2.2 Occupational Mobility

23 The mechanism underlying our theory is that individuals learn about their true calling by  
24 experiencing various occupations as they age. Following Kambourov and Manovskii (2008,  
25 2009), we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to document the

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<sup>4</sup>See also Topel (1984) and Shimer (1998) who emphasize the importance of higher separation rates in understanding higher unemployment rates for the young.

<sup>5</sup>Households in the CPS are surveyed for four consecutive months, then leave the sample during the next eight months, and are surveyed again for a final four months. Since each household member is uniquely identified, we obtain a longitudinal record for each person to construct monthly transitions. For a complete description of the longitudinal data, see Nekarda (2009).

<sup>6</sup>Note that the levels of transition rates naturally differ across the two measurement approaches. See also Menzio et al. (2015) who study data from the SIPP for male high-school graduates, December 1995 to February 2000. They find that the job finding rate is essentially constant between the ages of 20 and 55, and only fall in a noticeable way between the ages of 55 and 64. Separation rates exhibit a marked fall throughout the age profile, most notably between the ages of 20 and 35, as in the CPS data.

1 age-profile of occupational mobility.

2 As is well-known, measures of occupational mobility are subject to sizable measurement  
3 error. In order to mitigate this, the PSID released Retrospective Occupation-Industry Sup-  
4 plemental Data Files (Retrospective Files hereafter) in 1999. The goal was to retrospectively  
5 assign 3-digit 1970 census codes to the reported occupations and industries of respondents  
6 for the period 1968–80. [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2008, 2009\)](#) argue that the methodology  
7 minimizes the error in identifying true occupation switches.<sup>7</sup>

8 Figure 1 shows the life-cycle profile of occupational mobility rates at the 1-, 2-, and 3-digit  
9 level.<sup>8</sup> While the data and methodology underlying Figure 1 comes from [Kambourov and](#)  
10 [Manovskii \(2008\)](#), we adapt their exercise for the purpose of this study. First, we only use  
11 data from the period covered by the Retrospective files. Second, we use a broader sample,  
12 consisting of male household heads who are not self-employed and are either employed or  
13 temporarily laid-off.<sup>9</sup> The main difference from their sample is our inclusion of government  
14 workers and farmers, who tend to switch occupation less frequently than others.

15 *[FIGURE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

16 Figure 1 reveals that occupational mobility declines sharply as people age (see also  
17 [Moscarini and Vella \(2008\)](#) for evidence from CPS data). For the young, mobility rates  
18 are very high: more than 40% of individuals in the 20–24 year old age group switch occu-  
19 pation in a given year at the 3-digit level. Even at the 2-digit level, approximately one in  
20 three 20–24 year olds switch occupation annually. For prime-aged workers, about one in 10  
21 or 12 individuals change 2- or 3-digit occupation on a yearly basis.

22 These mobility rates can be used to calculate the number of occupations an individual  
23 experiences over her working life. Suppose that an individual enters the labor force and  
24 experiences her first occupation at age 20. Assuming a constant hazard rate between the  
25 ages of 20 and 24, the probability that she switches to a different 3-digit occupation during  
26 each of the first five years of her career is 41%; this would imply that she switches occupations  
27 2.05 times during the first five years. Similarly, over the next 10 years the average switching

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<sup>7</sup>For example, approximately half of occupation switches in the original data are identified as true occupation switches in the Retrospective Files. A key aspect of the methodology is that a single individual was responsible for coding the occupation of a particular individual over the entire sample period, thereby minimizing changes in interpretation of the occupation reported by an individual over time.

<sup>8</sup>See Appendix B of [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2008\)](#) for details of the occupation classification system.

<sup>9</sup>This implies that we do not include individuals who leave the labor force in the calculation. The mobility rate is the ratio of the number of individuals who switch occupations, divided by the total number of workers (i.e. the sum of “switchers” and “non-switchers”). If we count an individual who leaves the labor force as a non-switcher we generate a downward bias in the occupational mobility measure. Excluding those who leave the labor force from the sample avoids this bias.

1 probability is 24%, implying 2.40 occupation switches. Repeating this calculation for all the  
2 age groups yields that the average worker switches about 8.6 times, and hence works in 9.6  
3 3-digit occupations over her career. The same procedure indicates that the average person  
4 works in 7.3 and 6.6 occupations, at the 2- and 1-digit level, respectively.

5 This supports the notion that individuals learn about their true calling over the life cycle.  
6 In the model of Section 3, workers who switch occupations do so through intervening spells of  
7 unemployment. As such, we investigate data on occupational mobility *conditional on tran-*  
8 *siting from unemployment to employment*. We use the individual-level, matched CPS data  
9 during the 1994–2013 period and calculate, among those who transit from unemployment to  
10 employment, the fraction whose current occupation differs from the occupation during their  
11 previous employment spell.<sup>10</sup> Panel A of Table 3 displays these statistics at the 1-, 2-, and  
12 3-digit level. A number of results are worth noting.

13 *[TABLE 3 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

14 First, the probability that a worker switches occupations across employment spells when  
15 she transits through unemployment is very high. On average, approximately 50% of such  
16 transitions involve a 1-digit level occupation switch, and nearly 70% involve a 3-digit oc-  
17 cupation switch. We also find that on average, the occupation switching probability from  
18 unemployment-to-employment is approximately 15 times that of the occupation switching  
19 probability for employment-to-employment transitions at the 1-digit level (displayed in Panel  
20 B), and at the 3-digit level as well (not displayed for brevity).<sup>11</sup> Most importantly, we find  
21 that the rate of occupation switching is decreasing with age: for instance, at the 1-digit  
22 level, it falls from about 61% for 20–24 year olds to 39% for 55–64 year olds. Combined with  
23 the fact that the young experience much higher separation rates, this evidence is directly  
24 supportive of our mechanism: since the young are less likely to have found their true calling  
25 (relative to the old), they are also much more likely to experience occupation switching via  
26 a spell of unemployment.

## 27 **3 Economic Environment**

28 To analyze age differences in unemployment, we study a search-and-matching model of the  
29 labor market. The matching process between unemployed workers and vacancy posting

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<sup>10</sup>We use data beginning in 1994 when the redesign of the CPS significantly improved data quality (due to the introduction of dependent coding) regarding occupation classification at the monthly frequency (see [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2013\)](#) and [Moscarini and Thomsson \(2007\)](#)).

<sup>11</sup>Since the pool of employed individuals is much larger than the pool of unemployed individuals, the number of occupational switches from job-to-job is nevertheless non-negligible.



1 firms is subject to a search friction. The ratio of vacancies to unemployed determines the  
2 economy’s match probabilities, in a way that we make precise in the next subsection.

3 Workers differ in their knowledge of their best occupational fit. Specifically, there are  $M$   
4 occupations in the economy that are identical, except in name. Each worker is best-suited  
5 for one occupation; that is, only one occupation,  $m^* \in \{1, 2, \dots, M\}$ , is a best match, or the  
6 worker’s “true calling.” When a worker is employed in her true calling occupation,  $m^*$ , she  
7 produce  $f_G$  units of output. For simplicity, in all other  $M - 1$  occupations, the worker-firm  
8 pair produces  $f_B$  units of output, with  $f_B < f_G$ .

9 In each period, a mass of newly born workers enter the economy not knowing their  
10 true calling. A new worker has  $m^*$  randomly assigned into one of the  $M$  occupations with  
11 probability  $1/M$ . This assignment is distributed independently across all new workers. To  
12 learn whether a given occupation is their best fit, the worker must search, be matched,  
13 and work in that occupation. Learning about occupational fit in a match does not happen  
14 instantaneously. In each period of employment, the worker (and firm) learns whether it is  
15 the worker’s true calling with probability  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ .<sup>12</sup>

16 Given stochastic match creation, destruction, and learning, workers are heterogeneous  
17 with respect to their labor market history. This heterogeneity can be summarized by a  
18 worker’s *type*,  $i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ ; here,  $i$  indicates the number of ill-suited occupations the  
19 worker has identified, plus one. A worker of type  $i < M$  has previously sampled  $i - 1$   
20 ill-suited occupations, and therefore has  $M - i + 1$  left to try; a worker of type  $M$  knows  
21 her true calling,  $m^*$  (either having sampled  $M - 1$  ill-suited occupations, or having sampled  
22 fewer than that but gotten “lucky”). As such, a worker’s type summarizes her knowledge  
23 about her occupational fit, a form of human capital accumulated (stochastically) with labor  
24 market experience.

25 Workers understand that their true calling is uniformly distributed across occupations,  
26 and use this to form beliefs. An unemployed worker of type  $i = 1$  has a flat prior over  
27 all occupations, and randomly selects an occupation to search for employment. If that  
28 occupation turns out to be the wrong fit, the worker becomes type  $i = 2$  and updates  
29 her prior according to Bayes’ rule. Her true calling is now uniformly distributed over the  
30 remaining  $M - 1$  occupations, and randomly picks one of those to search in, the next time  
31 she is unemployed. Defining  $\pi_i$  as the probability, conditional on being matched in the  $i^{th}$

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<sup>12</sup>This constant hazard/learning rate can be viewed as the reduced form of a signal extraction problem. Specifically, Pries (2004) demonstrates how a model where match output is observed with uniform measurement error gives rise to “all-or-nothing” learning as in our model: with some probability, observed output reveals nothing about the occupational fit, while with complementary probability, the signal is perfectly revealing.

1 occupation, that the worker has found her true calling, we have that:

$$\pi_i = \frac{1}{M - i + 1}, \quad i = 1, \dots, M.$$

2 To close the description of the environment, we must take a stand on “death/exit” from  
3 the economy. For simplicity, we assume that each worker faces a constant probability of  
4 remaining in the labor market from one period to the next,  $\sigma \in (0, 1)$ . We interpret  $\beta$  in  
5 what follows as the “true” discount factor times this survival probability.

### 6 **3.1 Market Tightness**

7 There are  $M$  labor markets in the economy, one for each occupation. All unemployed workers  
8 seeking employment in a particular occupation search in that occupation’s market.

9 While a worker’s type is known to the worker, it is unobservable by vacancy posting  
10 firms. Workers are unable to signal their type to potential employers. A firm wishing  
11 to hire a worker in a particular occupation posts a vacancy in that occupation’s market,  
12 understanding that it may be matched with a worker of any type  $i \in \{1, \dots, M\}$ . The  
13 probability the firm assigns to being matched with a type  $i$  worker is taken parametrically,  
14 and determined by the equilibrium distribution of unemployed worker types. In this sense,  
15 matching is *random* within each occupational market.<sup>13</sup> Upon matching, the worker’s type  
16 is observable by both the worker and firm.

17 Given the symmetry assumptions of the model, all occupational markets are identical.  
18 We denote market tightness in the representative market,  $\theta$ , as the ratio of the number of  
19 vacancies maintained by firms to the number of workers searching in that occupation. While  
20  $\theta$  is an equilibrium object, it is taken parametrically by agents. We denote the probability  
21 that a worker will meet a vacancy—the job finding rate—by  $p(\theta)$ , where  $p : \mathcal{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is  
22 a strictly increasing function with  $p(0) = 0$ . Similarly, we let  $q(\theta)$  denote the probability  
23 that a vacancy meets a worker, where  $q : \mathcal{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is a strictly decreasing function with  
24  $q(\theta) \rightarrow 1$  as  $\theta \rightarrow 0$ , and  $q(\theta) = p(\theta)/\theta$ .

25 Finally, we note that this structure of matching markets implies that all unemployed  
26 workers face the same job finding rate. This feature allows us to isolate the role of oc-  
27 cupational learning in generating heterogeneity in separation rates. We find this to be an  
28 attractive feature of our approach, since age differences in separation fully account for age  
29 differences in unemployment, as discussed in Subsection 2.1.

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<sup>13</sup>See also Pries (2008) who studies a model with random search and heterogeneous workers.

## 3.2 Contractual Arrangement and Timing

We specify the worker's compensation in a match as being determined via Nash bargaining with fixed bargaining weights, as in Pissarides (1985). When an unemployed worker and a firm match, they begin producing output in the following period. In all periods of a match, compensation is bargained with complete knowledge of the worker's type.

## 3.3 Worker's Problem

Workers can either be unemployed or employed. Employed workers can either be: in a "good" match, working in their true calling occupation; in a "bad" match, in an occupation that is not their true calling; or in a match of yet unknown occupational fit.

We define  $U_i$  as the value of being unemployed for a worker of type  $i$ :

$$U_i = z + \beta [p(\theta)W'_{L,i} + (1 - p(\theta))U_i], \quad i = 1, \dots, M - 1. \quad (1)$$

Here,  $z$  is the flow value of unemployment,  $W_{L,i}$  is the worker's value of being employed in her  $i^{\text{th}}$  occupation and learning whether it is her true calling, and primes ( $'$ ) denote variables one period in the future. An unemployed worker transits to employment with probability  $p(\theta)$ , the job finding rate.

Once employed, the type  $i$  worker's value while in the "learning phase" is given by:

$$W_{L,i} = \omega_{L,i} + \beta(1 - \lambda) [(1 - \delta)W'_{L,i} + \delta U'_i] + \beta\lambda [\pi_i ((1 - \delta)W'_M + \delta U'_M) + (1 - \pi_i) ((1 - \delta)W'_{B,i} + \delta U'_{i+1})]. \quad (2)$$

In a match of unknown occupational fit, the worker earns per period compensation  $\omega_{L,i}$ , and learns whether this is her true calling with probability  $\lambda$ . If the worker does not learn, then she remains as type  $i$  in the following period.

If the worker learns about her fit in the current occupation, her continuation value is given by the square bracketed term in the second line of equation (2). With probability  $\pi_i$ , the worker has found her true calling, and becomes type  $i = M$ . Otherwise, the current occupation is not her true calling. If the match does not exogenously separate, she continues as a worker in a bad occupational match with value  $W_{B,i}$ . If the match separates, with exogenous probability  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ , she becomes unemployed of type  $i + 1$ , having eliminated an additional occupation as her true calling.

1 The worker's value of being employed in her true calling is given by:

$$W_M = \omega_M + \beta [(1 - \delta)W'_M + \delta U'_M]. \quad (3)$$

2 Obviously, if the match exogenously separates, the worker retains her type  $M$  as she knows  
3 her true calling; in this case, the value of being unemployed is:

$$U_M = z + \beta [p(\theta)W'_M + (1 - p(\theta))U'_M]. \quad (4)$$

4 Finally, the value of being employed in a bad match is given by:

$$W_{B,i} = \max \{ \omega_{B,i} + \beta [(1 - \delta)W'_{B,i} + \delta U'_{i+1}], U_{i+1} \}. \quad (5)$$

5 Note that the worker chooses either to remain in the match or, if preferred, to be unem-  
6 ployed. In the event of separation—whether exogenous or endogenous—the worker becomes  
7 unemployed of type  $i + 1$  as she knows that her last occupation was not her true calling.

8 This formulation assumes that workers will never sample an occupation that they already  
9 know is not their true calling. We show later in Proposition 1 that this is indeed a feature  
10 of the equilibrium: workers who have sampled  $i$  occupations that are not their best fit never  
11 sample one of these again upon separation.

### 12 3.4 Firm's Problem

13 Firms—or more correctly, vacancies for a specific occupation—can be either filled or unfilled.  
14 When filled, a vacancy may be matched with a worker for whom the occupation is her true  
15 calling. In this case, the firm's value is given by:

$$J_M = f_G - \omega_M + \beta [(1 - \delta)J'_M + \delta V'], \quad (6)$$

16 where  $f_G$  is the output in a true calling match, and  $\omega_M$  is the compensation paid to the  
17 worker. In the case of separation, the vacancy becomes unfilled with value  $V$ .

18 When matched with a type  $i$  worker who is in a bad occupational fit, match output is  
19 given by  $f_B$ , and the firm's value is:

$$J_{B,i} = \max \{ f_B - \omega_{B,i} + \beta [(1 - \delta)J'_{B,i} + \delta V'], V \}. \quad (7)$$

20 Firms in bad matches may choose to separate if it is in their best interest to do so.

1 Finally, a firm may be matched with a type  $i$  worker who is learning whether the current  
 2 occupation is her true calling. We specify the output in a learning match to equal its expected  
 3 value. This ensures consistency with the expectation used in the firm's determination of  
 4 vacancy creation, equation (9). In this case, the firm's value is given by:

$$J_{L,i} = \pi_i f_G + (1 - \pi_i) f_B - \omega_{L,i} + \beta \left[ \lambda(1 - \delta) [\pi_i J'_M + (1 - \pi_i) J'_{B,i}] + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta) J'_{L,i} + \delta V' \right]. \quad (8)$$

5 This is composed of the contemporaneous profit (expected match output minus the worker's  
 6 compensation) plus the continuation value.<sup>14</sup> With probability  $\lambda$ , the worker and firm learn  
 7 about the occupational fit. With probability  $\pi_i$ , this is the worker's true calling, and (con-  
 8 ditional on surviving) the match continues with value  $J_M$ ; otherwise, this is an ill-suited  
 9 occupational match and the continuation value is  $J_{B,i}$ .

10 We assume that there is a large number of firms who can potentially post vacancies in  
 11 any of the  $M$  occupational markets. Doing so requires the payment of a vacancy posting  
 12 cost,  $\kappa > 0$ . The value of posting a vacancy in the representative market is defined as:

$$V = -\kappa + \beta \left[ q(\theta) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M-1} \phi_i J'_{L,i} + \phi_M J'_M \right] + (1 - q(\theta)) V' \right]. \quad (9)$$

13 An unfilled vacancy is matched with a worker with probability  $q(\theta)$ . Upon filling the vacancy,  
 14 the firm observes the worker type that it has matched with. As such, the continuation value,  
 15 conditional upon matching, is probability weighted across the  $M$  types. Here,  $\phi_i$  denotes the  
 16 firm's probability of matching with a worker of type  $i$ , with  $\sum_{i=1}^M \phi_i = 1$ .

## 17 4 Equilibrium and Calibration

### 18 4.1 Definition of Equilibrium

19 A stationary equilibrium with Nash bargaining is a collection of value functions  $\left( \{J_{B,i}, J_{L,i}\}_{i=1}^{M-1}, \right.$   
 20  $J_M, V; \{U_i, W_{B,i}, W_{L,i}\}_{i=1}^{M-1}, U_M, W_M)$ , compensations  $\left( \{\omega_{L,i}, \omega_{B,i}\}_{i=1}^{M-1}, \omega_M \right)$ , a probability  
 21 distribution over unemployed workers  $\{\phi_i\}_{i=1}^M$ , and a tightness ratio  $\theta$  such that:

- 22 1. workers are optimizing:  $W_{L,i} > U_i, W_{B,i} \geq U_{i+1}, i = 1, \dots, M - 1$ , and  $W_M > U_M$ ;

---

<sup>14</sup>As discussed in footnote 12, our model is isomorphic to one in which output in the learning phase of a match is observed with measurement error.

- 1 2. firms are optimizing:  $J_{L,i}, J_M > V, J_{B,i} \geq V, i = 1, \dots, M$ ;
- 2 3. compensations solve generalized Nash bargaining problems, discussed below;
- 3 4. the probability distribution over unemployed workers is consistent with individual be-  
4 havior and the implied laws-of-motion across labor market states and worker types (see  
5 Appendix A for details); and
- 6 5. the free entry condition is satisfied. That is,  $V = 0$ .

7 We assume that compensation in a match is determined via generalized Nash bargaining.  
8 As this is standard in the literature, we provide details in Appendix B. We note, however,  
9 that the compensation in the learning phase of a match,  $\omega_{L,i}$ , contains a new term relative  
10 to the standard DMP model. We refer to this term,  $\beta\lambda [\pi_i U'_M + (1 - \pi_i)U'_{i+1} - U'_i]$ , as the  
11 *information value* of the match. This captures the discounted, expected gain to working  
12 and learning about the current occupational fit, and thus augmenting the worker's threat  
13 point in future bargaining. Moreover, the information value is *positive*; this follows as an  
14 immediate corollary of Proposition 1, which we establish below.

## 15 4.2 Characterizing Equilibrium

16 Here we establish that in any stationary equilibrium, the value of unemployment increases  
17 with workers' type:  $U_i < U_{i+1}, i = 1, \dots, M - 1$ . This result is useful not only as it leads  
18 to a sharp characterization of stationary equilibria, but also because unemployed workers in  
19 such equilibria have an incentive to become informed about their type or true calling.

20 **Proposition 1** *Assume that all bad matches endogenously separate, i.e.,  $W_{B,i} = U_{i+1}$  for*  
21 *all  $i = 1, \dots, M - 1$  in equation (5).<sup>15</sup> In any stationary equilibrium,  $U_i < U_{i+1}$  for  $i =$*   
22  *$1, 2, \dots, M - 1$ .*

23 The proof is contained in the Appendix C. A number of results follow immediately from  
24 this Proposition, collected in the following Corollary:

25 **Corollary 1** *Assume that all bad matches endogenously separate. Then: (a)  $J_{L,i+1} > J_{L,i}$ ;*  
26 *(b)  $W_{L,i+1} - U_{i+1} > W_{L,i} - U_i$ ; (c)  $W_{L,i+1} - W_{L,i} > U_{i+1} - U_i > 0$ , so  $W_{L,i+1} > W_{L,i}$ ; and*  
27 *(d)  $\pi_i U_M + (1 - \pi_i)U_{i+1} - U_i > 0$ .*

---

<sup>15</sup>This assumption holds in all equilibria we compute in Section 5.

1 Finally, we note that when all bad matches separate, only type  $i = M$  matches separate  
 2 at the exogenous rate  $\delta$ . All other matches—namely, learning-phase matches—separate at  
 3 rate  $\delta + (1 - \delta)\lambda(1 - \pi_i) > \delta$ . Moreover,  $\pi_{i+1} > \pi_i$ . Hence, our model obtains a declining  
 4 age profile of separation because older workers are more likely to be of higher type.

### 5 4.3 Calibration

6 Many of our model features are standard to the DMP literature, so our strategy is to maintain  
 7 comparability wherever possible. The model is calibrated to a monthly frequency. The  
 8 discount factor is set to  $\beta = 0.996$  to accord with an annual risk free rate of 5%.

9 We assume that the matching function in each occupational market is Cobb-Douglas:

$$p(\theta) = \theta q(\theta) = \theta^\alpha.$$

10 Summarizing the literature that directly estimates the matching function using aggregate  
 11 data, [Petrongolo and Pissarides \(2001\)](#) establish a plausible range for  $\alpha$  of 0.3 – 0.5. Refining  
 12 the inference approaches of [Shimer \(2005\)](#) and [Mortensen and Nagypál \(2007\)](#), [Brügemann \(2008\)](#)  
 13 obtains a range of 0.37–0.46. We specify  $\alpha = 0.4$  to be near the mid point of these  
 14 ranges (see also [Pissarides \(2009\)](#)). For comparability with previous work, we specify the  
 15 parameter in the Nash bargaining problem as  $\tau = 1 - \alpha$ .

16 To calibrate  $\delta$  and  $\kappa$ , we target two aggregate moments. First, we set the aggregate  
 17 unemployment rate among the model’s 20–64 year old workers to equal 5.75%. This corre-  
 18 sponds to the average unemployment rate observed among 20–64 year olds in the the CPS  
 19 data, between 1976:6 to 2012:11. Second, we set the aggregate job finding rate to equal  
 20 38.5% to match the job finding rate observed during the same time period in the U.S. data.  
 21 These two moments pin down the parameters to be  $\delta = 0.012$  and  $\kappa = 0.235$ .<sup>16</sup>

22 The model’s aggregate unemployment rate depends on the age distribution of endogenous  
 23 separation rates. This, in turn, depends on the model’s age distribution of workers. We set  
 24 the survival probability,  $\sigma$ , to best match the age distribution of the labor force observed in  
 25 the data. Specifically, we minimize the sum of squared residuals between the model implied  
 26 labor force shares in the 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64 age bins, with their average  
 27 values in the CPS data, 1976:6 to 2012:11. This results in a value of  $\sigma = 0.9984$ .<sup>17</sup> As a

---

<sup>16</sup>More precisely, we normalize  $\theta$  to one, and use a match efficiency parameter  $\eta$  in the matching technology, so that  $p(\theta) = \eta\theta^\alpha$ , with  $\eta = 0.385$ . For any value of  $\delta$ , then, the free entry condition implies a value for  $\kappa$ . We then iterate on  $\delta$  until the model replicates an unemployment rate of 5.75% among the 20–64 year olds.

<sup>17</sup>The exact age distribution generated by the model is discussed in detail in Section 6.

1 check, we find that this implies an average worker age of 39.02 years in the model, which  
2 matches the average age found in the data to the second decimal place.

3 Our calibration of  $z$ , the flow value of unemployment, follows the strategy of [Hall and](#)  
4 [Milgrom \(2008\)](#), [Mortensen and Nagypál \(2007\)](#), and [Pissarides \(2009\)](#). We interpret  $z$  as  
5 being composed of two components: a value of leisure or home production, and a value  
6 associated with unemployment benefits. As in their work, the return to leisure/home pro-  
7 duction is equated to 43% of the average return to market work. Given this, the model’s  
8 Nash bargained compensation, and the steady state distribution of worker types, we set  
9  $z = 0.56$ . This implies an unemployment benefit replacement rate of 35% for the lowest type  
10 ( $i = 1$ ) workers, and 20% for the highest type ( $i = M$ ) workers; this accords with the range  
11 of replacement rates reported by [Hall and Milgrom \(2008\)](#).

12 In the model exposition of Section 3, we defined  $M$  as the total number of occupations  
13 in the economy. Taking this literally would imply an unreasonably large value; for instance,  
14 there are currently about 500 census occupation codes at the 3-digit level. A more nuanced  
15 reading of the model reveals that  $M$  is the number of occupations an individual views as  
16 being in her set of potential “best fits” with her skills/tastes when she first enters the labor  
17 market.<sup>18</sup> Since  $M$  is clearly not observable, we calibrate it based on the data on occupa-  
18 tional mobility of [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2008\)](#). Taking the age profile of occupational  
19 switching rates as hazard rates implies that the average individual works in 9.6 three-digit  
20 occupations over her career. Matching this statistic in our model would require  $M = 19$ ;  
21 defining occupations at the 1-digit level would imply setting  $M = 13$ . This interpretation of  
22 the occupational mobility data might overstate our model’s ability to match age difference  
23 in separation; this occurs if some of observed occupational switches happen without an in-  
24 tervening spell of unemployment, such as internal promotions, for example. Given this, we  
25 choose to be conservative and set  $M = 10$  in our baseline calibration, so that the average  
26 worker experiences 5 occupations over her career.<sup>19</sup>

27 Relative to the standard DMP model, our model emphasizes the role of learning about  
28 one’s true calling that occurs through the sampling of occupations. Knowledge about oc-

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<sup>18</sup>Under this interpretation, individuals are homogenous in  $M$  but can be heterogeneous in the identities of those  $M$  occupations. In this way, the model can be rationalized with the many ( $> M$ ) occupations observed in the data; all that is required is that the distribution of occupation identities across the continuum of individuals’ choice sets is consistent with the distribution of agent types within an occupation, so that the firm’s value of vacancy creation satisfies equation (9).

<sup>19</sup>We note that [Topel and Ward \(1992\)](#) find that the typical male high school graduate holds approximately 10 or 11 jobs throughout his career. Given the different datasets, time periods, and sample selection criteria employed, their statistics on job mobility need not correspond with ours on occupational mobility. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the similarity in mobility, and that the number of jobs exceeds the number of occupations (since not all job changes involve an occupation change).



1 occupational fit represents a form of human capital that is acquired through labor market  
2 experience. Given this, it is natural to calibrate the remaining novel parameters of our  
3 model— $f_G$ ,  $f_B$ , and  $\lambda$ —to match the empirical life-cycle earnings profile, as estimated by  
4 [Murphy and Welch \(1990\)](#) and others. In our baseline calibration, we assume that the returns  
5 to occupational learning match exactly the returns to labor market experience.

6 We choose  $f_G/f_B$  and  $\lambda$  to match two key properties of the return to experience. First,  
7 the maximal lifetime wage gain for a typical worker represents an approximate doubling of  
8 earnings. Second, this doubling occurs after the typical worker has accumulated 25 years of  
9 experience. Normalizing  $f_G = 1$  and matching these statistics in our model requires setting  
10  $f_B = 0.57$  and  $\lambda = 1/18$ .<sup>20</sup> This implies that a worker’s match productivity is 75% higher  
11 in her true calling than in any other occupation, and that it takes, on average, 18 months in  
12 a match in order to learn the occupational fit.

13 In our results, we assume that workers are “born” into the workforce at the age of 19.5  
14 years old. We allow 6 months to elapse before tracking labor market outcomes, so that the  
15 youngest worker in the age-specific statistics we report is 20 years old.

## 16 5 Accounting for Age Differences in Unemployment

17 Subsection 5.1 presents results for the baseline calibration of our model, specifically, its  
18 ability to match the life-cycle labor market facts. Subsection 5.2 discusses robustness of our  
19 results to variation in  $M$ ,  $f_G/f_B$ , and  $\lambda$ .

### 20 5.1 Results

21 The first row of Panel A, Table 4 reproduces the unemployment rate by age displayed in  
22 Table 1. The second row displays the age profile of unemployment generated by the model.  
23 Occupational learning over the life cycle implies that unemployment falls as workers age and  
24 find their true calling. Through this mechanism, our model does a very good job at matching  
25 the observed age profile of unemployment.

26 *[TABLE 4 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

27 The assumption of random search within an occupational market implies that the job  
28 finding rate of all workers is identical. As such, all age differences in unemployment are

---

<sup>20</sup>Technically, given the non-deterministic nature of our model, the expected life-cycle profile of earnings only asymptotes to the theoretical maximal value as time approaches  $\infty$ . Hence, our calibration procedure requires that earnings come within 0.25% of fully doubling at the 25 year horizon.

1 driven by differences in separation rates. Separation rates differ across workers because they  
2 face different endogenous separation probabilities. In our baseline calibration, all workers  
3 choose to separate if they learn that their current match is of poor occupational fit. Hence, as  
4 discussed in Subsection 4.2, our model obtains a declining age profile of separation because  
5 older workers are more likely to have found their true calling.

6 This can be seen in Panel B of Table 4 where we display separation rates by age.<sup>21</sup> In  
7 the baseline calibration of our model, young workers aged 20–24 years old tend not to have  
8 found their true calling; as such, they face a separation rate of 5.33%. On the other hand,  
9 old workers aged 55–64 have essentially all found their true calling; their separation rate of  
10 1.20% is essentially identical to the calibrated exogenous separation rate,  $\delta$ . Moreover, our  
11 model does a good job of accounting for the age profile of separation rates. For example, the  
12 separation rate of 20–24 year olds is 4.4 times that of either the 45–54 or 55–64 year olds. In  
13 the U.S. data, this ratio is 4.0 and 4.4, respectively. Hence, the reason our model overstates  
14 age differences in unemployment rates is because of our simplifying assumption of identical  
15 job finding rates.

16 *[FIGURE 2 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

17 Finally, we note that our model does a good job of replicating the age profile of occupa-  
18 tional mobility. Figure 2 displays the occupational switching rate at the annual frequency for  
19 different age groups in our model; this is analogous to Figure 1 derived from the PSID data  
20 studied by Kambourov and Manovskii (2008). For young workers aged 20–24 years old, the  
21 model generates an occupational switching rate of 32% which is very close to the rate found  
22 at the 2-digit occupational level in the data. However, occupational mobility falls faster in  
23 the model relative to the data: by the time workers reach prime age, essentially everyone  
24 has found their true calling, and the occupational switching rate is near zero. We address  
25 this shortcoming in an extension of the model presented in Section 7.

## 26 5.2 Robustness

27 Here we explore the robustness of our results to variations from the baseline calibration. We  
28 first consider the effect of changing  $M$ , the number of potential occupations. To see that  $M$   
29 affects the ability to generate age differences in unemployment, consider the case of  $M = 1$ :  
30 the model collapses to the standard representative worker DMP model (augmented with a  
31 constant survival probability). Panels C and D of Table 5 address this exercise. First, we

---

<sup>21</sup>For the U.S. data, we report separation rates as calculated in Shimer (2005), as this method accords with our model’s assumption that workers do not transit in and out of labor force participation during their working-age life.

1 reduce the number of occupations to  $M = 7$ ; this accords with the implied number of 1-digit  
 2 occupations worked by the average individual using the PSID data. Doing so reduces the  
 3 amount of time a worker spends over her life cycle searching for her true calling.<sup>22</sup>

4 *[TABLE 5 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

5 Despite the 30% reduction in the number of potential occupations, the model still de-  
 6 livers sizable age differences in unemployment and separation. Young workers in the model  
 7 experience an unemployment rate that is 3.0 times that of 45–54 year olds. In terms of  
 8 separation rates, the model delivers a ratio of 20–24 year olds to 45–54 year olds of 3.25,  
 9 close to the ratio of 4.0 observed in the data. For similar reasons, Panel D of Table 5 shows  
 10 that increasing the number of potential occupations to  $M = 13$  amplifies the age differences  
 11 in unemployment and separation.

12 In our second robustness exercise, we increase the learning rate to  $\lambda = 1/12$ . This  
 13 represents a 50% increase relative to the baseline calibration, so that workers learn their  
 14 occupational fit in a match in 12 months, on average. Increasing  $\lambda$  has the effect of reducing  
 15 the amount of time a worker spends over her life cycle searching for her true calling. The  
 16 results are displayed in Panel E of Table 5.

17 Not surprisingly, increasing  $\lambda$  causes workers to spend more of the early part of their career  
 18 unemployed, as they transition between occupations. Relative to Panel B, the unemployment  
 19 and separation rates of 20–24 year olds are 25% higher. Beyond this age group, workers are  
 20 more likely to have found their true calling, and age differences among 25 to 64 year old  
 21 workers are compressed compared to the baseline calibration.

22 Finally, we note that our main results are essentially unaffected by the value of  $f_B$  relative  
 23 to  $f_G$  (recall that we normalize  $f_G = 1$ ). This follows from the fact that the allocation is  
 24 invariant to this ratio as long as matches endogenously separate when an occupation is  
 25 revealed to be a poor fit. Under our benchmark calibration, increasing  $f_B$  relative to  $f_G$  has  
 26 no impact on the unemployment nor the separation rates as long as  $f_B/f_G < 0.92$ .<sup>23</sup> This  
 27 invariance result can be derived analytically, and demonstrated simply when  $M = 2$ .<sup>24</sup> In  
 28 this case, bad matches endogenously separate as long as

$$f_B < z + \beta p(\theta)\tau \left[ \frac{f_G - z}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta - p(\theta)\tau)} \right],$$

---

<sup>22</sup>In all robustness exercises, the rest of the parameter values are reset to maintain the remaining cali-  
 bration targets discussed in Subsection 4.3. Specifically, we keep targeting the job finding rate of 38.5% by  
 recalibrating  $\kappa$ , and set  $\delta$  to match a 5.75% working-age unemployment rate.

<sup>23</sup>While the allocation is invariant to changes in  $f_B/f_G$  in the relevant range, such is obviously not the  
 case for wages.

<sup>24</sup>The general proof, for  $M \geq 2$ , is available from the authors upon request.

1 highlighting that equilibrium allocations are invariant as long as  $f_B$  satisfies a cutoff rule.

## 2 **5.3 Discussion**

3 Our model has been kept intentionally simple. As a result, there are obvious extensions to  
4 be fruitfully considered, both theoretically and quantitatively. For instance, upon learning  
5 about occupational fit within a match, agents receive a perfectly informative signal about  
6 whether the worker has found her true calling. If instead signals were noisy, separation  
7 decisions would be a richer function of prior and posterior beliefs, and might lead to workers  
8 switching back to previously sampled occupations, as observed in the data (see, for instance,  
9 [Papageorgiou \(2014\)](#) for analysis along this dimension). Similarly, the only form of human  
10 capital being accumulated in our model is knowledge of one’s true calling. On the other  
11 hand, if workers accumulated occupation-specific or firm-specific human capital on the job,  
12 workers may choose not to switch occupations, even if they learn that they are not in their  
13 true calling (see, for instance, [Gervais et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Wee \(2016\)](#)). Finally, we note that  
14 all occupation switching in our model occurs through unemployment. This would obviously  
15 differ in a model with on-the-job search (see, for instance, [Menzio et al. \(2015\)](#)).

## 16 **6 Labor Force Aging and Aggregate Unemployment**

17 Age differences in unemployment imply that changes in the age composition of the labor  
18 force can influence the aggregate unemployment rate. Specifically, the entrance of the baby  
19 boom generation into the U.S. workforce and its subsequent aging potentially accounts for  
20 part of the low-frequency movements in aggregate unemployment. Indeed, based on the  
21 time series evidence, [Shimer \(1998\)](#) shows that compositional change due to the baby boom  
22 generated a substantial fraction of the rise and fall in unemployment from the 1960s through  
23 to the end of the century. More recently, [Shimer \(2001\)](#) and [Foote \(2007\)](#) exploit cross-state  
24 variation in the share of young workers and find mixed results.<sup>25</sup>

25 Given this, we ask what fraction of the observed change in aggregate unemployment  
26 can be accounted for by the “learning about occupational fit” mechanism embodied in our  
27 analysis. Specifically, we keep all parameters of the model identical to the benchmark cali-  
28 bration, except for the value of the labor market survival probability,  $\sigma$ , which determines

---

<sup>25</sup>Specifically, [Shimer \(2001\)](#) finds that a state’s unemployment rate falls when its youth share rises. [Foote \(2007\)](#) shows that this result disappears once the presence of spatial correlation in state-level data is taken into account; indeed, [Foote \(2007\)](#) finds point estimates for the youth share effect on unemployment that are positive and aligned with the findings of [Shimer \(1998\)](#), though with large standard errors.

1 the model’s age distribution of the labor force. By varying this parameter, we are able to  
2 “tilt” the age distribution to resemble that of the late-1970’s, when the baby boom first  
3 entered the labor force, and compare the resulting unemployment rate predictions to those  
4 when the age distribution resembles the recent period.

5 Panel A of Table 6 replicates the U.S. data averaged over the 1976:6–2012:11 period, as  
6 well as results for the model calibrated to this time period, as presented in Table 4. It also  
7 provides additional information pertaining to the age distribution of the labor force. Given  
8 that the model has only one parameter,  $\sigma$ , to match the age distribution, the benchmark  
9 calibration does a surprisingly good job at replicating the U.S. data.

10 *[TABLE 6 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

11 The first two rows of Panel B present U.S. data averaged over 1976–1983. This is when  
12 the baby boom entered the workforce, as evidenced by the larger share of the labor force aged  
13 34 years and younger, relative to 1976–2012 as a whole. This early period is also marked by  
14 higher aggregate unemployment.

15 Since this is a short, eight year time period, a simple time-series average of the un-  
16 employment rate is unlikely to eliminate the effects of business cycle fluctuations. This is  
17 particularly true since 1976–1983 featured many years of recession and relatively few boom  
18 years. As a result, we use the HP filter to eliminate the cyclical component of the unemploy-  
19 ment data.<sup>26</sup> Given our interest in “steady state” analysis and the impact of low-frequency  
20 change in demographics, we present the average unemployment rate of the HP filtered trend.  
21 The rightmost column of Panel B indicates that aggregate unemployment was high in this  
22 period: 6.59%, as compared to 5.75% during 1976–2012. This is true of each age-specific  
23 unemployment rate as well.

24 The bottom two rows of Panel B present results from our model calibrated to this time  
25 period. We lower the survival probability to  $\sigma = 0.9978$  in order to minimize the sum of  
26 squared residuals between the model’s labor force shares in each age bin and the average  
27 values observed in the data. As a check, we find that this value of  $\sigma$  implies an average  
28 worker age of 37.85 years in the model as compared to 37.90 in the U.S. data. Panel B  
29 indicates that the model does well in replicating the higher aggregate unemployment rate  
30 observed during this period. Lowering  $\sigma$  raises the 20–64 year old unemployment rate to  
31 6.25%. This is close to the value of 6.59% found in the data.

32 Panel C of Table 6 presents results for the period 2002–2009. Obviously, the labor force  
33 is noticeably older given the aging of the baby boom. The aggregate unemployment rate is

---

<sup>26</sup>Since the HP filter performs poorly near the endpoints of time series, we extend the unemployment rate data to 1950 before applying the filter.

1 also noticeably lower.<sup>27</sup> The bottom rows present results from the model. To best match the  
2 labor force age distribution during this period, we set  $\sigma = 0.9992$ . This implies an average  
3 worker age of 40.50 in the model as compared to 40.54 in the U.S. data. Again, the model  
4 does a good job of accounting for observed unemployment. Aging of the workforce causes  
5 the aggregate unemployment rate to fall to 5.32%, as compared to 5.17% in the data.

6 Hence, aging of the labor force—in a manner that best matches that observed from the  
7 late-1970’s to present—causes aggregate unemployment to fall by 0.93 pp in our model.<sup>28</sup>  
8 This compares with a fall of 1.42 pp in the U.S. data. As such, the model rationalizes 65%  
9 of the observed change in aggregate unemployment.

10 The changes in aggregate unemployment rates shown in Table 6, both for the actual and  
11 the model-generated data, can be decomposed into two components: one that is *mechanical*,  
12 due simply to changes in labor force shares, and an equilibrium or *behavioral* response. Com-  
13 paring the age-specific unemployment rates across Panels B and C highlights that the change  
14 in aggregate unemployment generated by the model is not simply mechanical. As the labor  
15 force ages, the unemployment rate of 20–24 year olds falls from 12.57% to 11.96%; that of  
16 45–54 year olds falls from 3.15% to 2.99%. This behavioral implication of our model is con-  
17 sistent with the U.S. data: labor force aging has been accompanied by lower unemployment  
18 rates for workers of all age groups.

19 In our model, this equilibrium effect operates through the free entry condition (equation  
20 (9)). As the labor force ages, the endogenous distribution of unemployed worker types shifts:  
21 there are fewer low-type workers, and more workers who know their true calling. Hence, for  
22 any given vacancy cost, firms are willing to create more vacancies per unemployed worker,  
23 since the expected surplus from a match is greater.<sup>29</sup> This results in a higher job finding  
24 rate, and lower unemployment rate, among all workers.

25 Indeed, it is possible to quantify the relative importance of the two effects on the un-  
26 employment rate change generated by the model. The mechanical component takes the  
27 age-specific unemployment rates in Panel B, and weights them by the 2002–2009 labor force

---

<sup>27</sup>Again, given the properties of the HP filter at endpoints of time series, we end our analysis in 2009, and omit the filtered data from the last three years of the sample. Including the Great Recession would increase the observed unemployment rates. Given our calibrated results, this would improve the model’s ability to explain the observed unemployment rate changes via demographic change.

<sup>28</sup>As a point of reference, our results are similar to the empirical results of [Shimer \(1998\)](#), who finds that aging generates a 1.20 pp fall in aggregate unemployment from the mid-1970s to the late-1990s.

<sup>29</sup>See also [Pries \(2008\)](#) who emphasizes the importance of compositional change in the pool of unemployed workers in explaining business cycle fluctuations in unemployment. Note also that the model of [Shimer \(2001\)](#) embodies the opposite prediction to ours: incentives for vacancy creation are higher in younger labor markets. This is due to his assumption of match-specific productivity, as opposed to occupation-specific productivity in our analysis.

1 shares of Panel C, implying an aggregate unemployment rate of 5.63%. Hence, of the 93 basis  
2 point fall in unemployment across the two periods, the mechanical effect of age composition  
3 change accounts for  $(6.25 - 5.63) / 0.93 = 67\%$ . The other 33% is due to the equilibrium  
4 effect of increased job creation.

5 Repeating this calculation with the U.S. data reveals that the effect of labor force aging  
6 implies a 60 basis point fall between 1976–83 and 2002–09.<sup>30</sup> Given the observed fall in  
7 aggregate unemployment, the mechanical component accounts for 43% of the change in the  
8 U.S. data. As such, while the model clearly embodies a non-trivial internal propagation  
9 mechanism to labor force composition change, it understates the actual behavioral response.

## 10 7 Job Displacement and Occupational Mobility

11 In this Section, we consider a simple extension of our model to study the individual-level  
12 earnings response to job loss. We illustrate how the mechanism linking job separation,  
13 unemployment, and occupational mobility over the life-cycle is capable of rationalizing the  
14 heterogeneity of responses documented in the literature on *job displacement*.

15 Following the seminal work of [Jacobson et al. \(1993\)](#), a number of studies have docu-  
16 mented the large and persistent effects of job displacement on earnings and wages, especially  
17 for prime-aged workers and those with significant job tenure. We very briefly summarize  
18 those findings here.<sup>31</sup> Though, the precise concept of a displacement varies from paper to  
19 paper, the common defining feature is that it involves an involuntary job separation. In the  
20 period of the separation, the average earnings loss is on the order of 25%; much of this effect  
21 is due to the direct effect of lost employment. However, even 5 or 10 years later, the average  
22 effect of the displacement on earnings is still negative, indicating that workers tend to earn  
23 lower wages when subsequently re-employed.

24 Relative to this average effect, the literature also documents substantial heterogeneity.  
25 For instance, from the Displaced Worker Survey, [Kletzer \(1998\)](#) finds that while a third of  
26 re-employed workers earn substantially less than on their pre-displacement job, an equal or  
27 larger fraction earn the same or more on their new job. Moreover, [Stevens \(1997\)](#) shows  
28 that the displacement effects covary with individual characteristics. Specifically, using data  
29 from the PSID, [Stevens \(1997\)](#) finds that large and persistent losses are concentrated among  
30 workers who switch occupations across spells of unemployment: wage losses of workers who

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<sup>30</sup>Using a similar methodology for the 16+ population, [Elsby et al. \(2010\)](#) find that the mechanical component accounts for an approximate 100 basis point fall from the 1976–83 period to 2009.

<sup>31</sup>See, for example, [Kletzer \(1998\)](#) for a comprehensive survey.

1 return to the same pre-displacement occupation are less pronounced and recover quickly.<sup>32</sup>  
 2 Furthermore, those who experience persistent wage losses are also more likely to be those  
 3 who experience subsequent job losses following the initial displacement.

4 Our framework emphasizing the relationship between job separation and occupational  
 5 mobility is well suited to addressing these facts. To begin, note that the benchmark model  
 6 of Section 3 already rationalizes the substantial fraction of workers who experience re-  
 7 employment wage gains or negligible wage losses following job separation. This is because a  
 8 worker’s type is non-decreasing, and wages are increasing in type ( $\omega_M > \omega_{L,i}$  for all  $i < M$ ,  
 9 and  $\omega_{L,j} > \omega_{L,i}$  for  $j > i$ ). To capture occasional large, discrete wage losses, we extend the  
 10 model by allowing for *occupational displacement* shocks. For simplicity, we assume that only  
 11 individuals who have found their true-calling (type  $M$ ) are subject to such shocks.

12 Specifically, in each period type  $M$  individuals face a probability,  $\psi$ , that they lose their  
 13 occupational fit. One interpretation is that from time-to-time, workers lose the skill/taste  
 14 to perform their true calling occupation. Alternatively, this shock could represent a plant  
 15 closure or mass layoff that causes a type  $M$  worker’s occupation to disappear or become  
 16 obsolete in her local labor market. When hit by the displacement shock, the worker’s type  
 17 is reset: she gets “knocked down” the type ladder to a type  $x < M$ , and must search again  
 18 for her new true-calling occupation.<sup>33</sup> Given this, the worker switches occupation upon re-  
 19 employment and experiences a discrete wage loss relative to her previous job. Moreover,  
 20 given that she is re-employed in an occupation that is likely to be a poor occupational fit,  
 21 she faces a higher probability of subsequent job separations as she learns about her (new)  
 22 true calling. All of these features are consistent with the results of [Stevens \(1997\)](#).

23 For brevity, we discuss only the type  $M$  value functions affected by introducing the  
 24 occupational displacement shock, and make the remaining details of the model available  
 25 upon request. The values of being an unemployed and employed type  $M$  worker become:

$$\begin{aligned} U_M &= z + \beta [(1 - \psi) (p(\theta)W'_M + (1 - p(\theta))U'_M) + \psi U'_x], \\ W_M &= w_M + \beta [(1 - \psi) (\delta U'_M + (1 - \delta)W'_M) + \psi U'_x], \end{aligned}$$

26 where  $U_x$  denotes the value of being unemployed as type  $x$ , and  $x$  is the type to which a

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<sup>32</sup>[Stevens \(1997\)](#) finds that the same result applies when one conditions on whether the individual switches industry after job displacement; see also the results of [Jacobson et al. \(1993\)](#). It should be noted that, likely due to sample size limitations of the PSID, [Stevens \(1997\)](#) does not present results when occupation and industry switching are considered simultaneously. Hence, these results may be partially driven by confounding variation.

<sup>33</sup>For example,  $x = 1$  would correspond to a situation where an individual’s labor market experience is irrelevant to identifying her new occupational fit. By contrast,  $x > 1$  would be a situation where an individual’s past experience imparts some knowledge relevant to determining her new true calling.



1 worker who has been hit by the shock resets to. Similarly, the value of a firm matched with  
2 a type  $M$  worker becomes:

$$J_M = f_G - w_M + \beta [(1 - \psi) ((1 - \delta)J'_M + \delta V') + \psi V'] .$$

3 To analyze the quantitative implications of this model, we calibrate the two new parame-  
4 ters,  $\psi$  and  $x$ , to key findings from the literature. [Kletzer \(1998\)](#) indicates that approximately  
5 one-third of workers experience large wage losses (losses greater than 25%) when they re-  
6 gain employment following a job displacement (i.e., involuntary separation). Data from  
7 the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) from 2000:12–2014:11 indicate that  
8 around 40% of job separations are involuntary. Since the distinction between various types  
9 of separations does not exist in our model, we set  $\psi$  such that 13.3% (one-third of 40%) of  
10 workers who become unemployed in any given period experience occupational displacement.  
11 We adjust the exogenous separation probability,  $\delta$ , to maintain an aggregate unemployment  
12 rate of 5.75% among the working-age population. Finally, we set  $x = M - 3$ . This implies  
13 that workers who are displaced experience a 35% wage cut upon re-employment. Moreover,  
14 wage losses are persistent: 5 years after separation, wages are on average 10% lower than  
15 pre-displacement levels, consistent with the evidence provided by [Stevens \(1997\)](#).

16 *[TABLE 7 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

17 Table 7 displays labor market statistics by age for the extended model, along with the  
18 statistics for the U.S. data and benchmark model (originally displayed in Table 4). As is  
19 clear, the life-cycle profiles for unemployment and separation rates are very similar to that  
20 obtained by the benchmark model; as such, the model extension continues to do a very good  
21 job of capturing observed age differences in unemployment and separation.

22 *[FIGURE 3 GOES ABOUT HERE]*

23 Figure 3 displays occupational mobility by age in the extended model. While all age-  
24 groups are affected by the introduction of occupational displacement, this phenomenon pri-  
25 marily affects prime-age and older workers, since they are most likely to have found their  
26 true calling. As a result, more than 6% of workers aged 45 and older switch occupation on  
27 an annual basis. This closely resembles the switching rate observed in the PSID data, as  
28 shown in Figure 1, and represents a marked increase over the benchmark model, as displayed  
29 in Figure 2. Hence, this simple extension of the model is not only consistent with the find-  
30 ings from the job displacement literature, but also improves upon the benchmark model in  
31 rationalizing the life-cycle profile of occupational mobility, while simultaneously capturing  
32 the life-cycle profile of unemployment.

## 8 Comparison with Match Quality Models

As noted in the Introduction, our model is not the only one capable of rationalizing the life-cycle profile of unemployment. [Menzio et al. \(2015\)](#) discuss how a model featuring idiosyncratic worker-firm match productivity, as in [Jovanovic \(1979\)](#), can deliver declining unemployment and job separation by age. Since older workers have had more opportunities to draw from the match quality distribution, they are more likely to be in a match with higher idiosyncratic productivity. Here, we discuss the key distinctions between this match quality mechanism and “learning about occupational fit” as featured in our model.

First, as discussed in [Section 7](#), our model is able to capture the heterogeneity in re-employment wage effects of job displacement shocks. In particular, our model naturally rationalizes the covariation of large wage losses with occupational switching across spells of unemployment, as documented in [Stevens \(1997\)](#). By contrast, models focused on heterogeneity in worker-firm match quality such as [Menzio et al. \(2015\)](#), simply cannot speak to this feature of the data as there is no well-defined notion of an “occupation” that is conceptually distinct from a match or “job.”

More fundamentally, the mechanisms differ in terms of what is being learned in a match. In the [Jovanovic \(1979\)](#) framework, agents learn about the match quality between worker and firm, or *firm-specific* human capital. In our model, agents learn about the quality of the match between worker and occupation. This knowledge of one’s true calling is a form of *general* human capital that workers carry forward into the future. In contrast to the [Jovanovic \(1979\)](#) and [Menzio et al. \(2015\)](#) mechanism where young workers are more likely to be in matches with lower firm-specific productivity, our model’s declining age profile of separation is because young workers are more likely to be in matches with lower *occupation-specific* productivity. As such, our model is consistent with the results of [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2009\)](#) who find that the importance of firm-specific effects in rationalizing life-cycle wage dynamics vanishes when occupation-specific and total experience effects are taken into account in Mincerian wage regressions. Note that while [Pavan \(2011\)](#) also finds that the returns to tenure in a career (industry-occupation pair) are important in accounting for life cycle mobility and wage growth patterns, he finds a bigger role for match specific returns than [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2009\)](#).

This difference in the nature of human capital also has important implications for the life-cycle pattern of job mobility. In our model, separation from a match is due to the accumulation of general human capital (knowledge about occupational fit). This generates a lower probability of separation in future matches. By contrast, when human capital is firm-specific, a match separation implies the loss of this human capital, and imparts no

1 information about a worker’s separation rate in future matches. This “resetting” property  
2 of unemployment is squarely at odds with the data. In a highly influential paper, [Topel and](#)  
3 [Ward \(1992\)](#) document that, conditional on starting a new job, the separation rate from that  
4 job is a decreasing function of prior labor market experience. For instance, for workers with  
5 at least 8 years of labor market experience, the probability that a new job lasts at least three  
6 years is 2.2 times greater than for workers with at most 1 year of experience. In models of  
7 idiosyncratic worker-firm match productivity, all unemployed workers are identical. Hence,  
8 this mechanism predicts no difference in the expected duration of new jobs as a function of  
9 prior experience. By contrast, our model is consistent with [Topel and Ward \(1992\)](#)’s finding:  
10 workers with greater labor market experience know more about their true calling occupation,  
11 and hence, face a lower separation probability in any new match.

12 To summarize, our model of learning about occupational fit is consistent with the empir-  
13 ical evidence on job displacement, Mincerian wage regressions, and the relationship between  
14 job mobility and labor market experience. This allows us to draw a clear distinction between  
15 our framework and those emphasizing learning about idiosyncratic match productivity.

## 16 9 Conclusion

17 In this paper, we study one of the key life cycle labor market facts: that unemployment  
18 declines as a function of age. We propose a simple model of occupational learning that  
19 accounts for this fact. Young workers, who are less likely to have found their “true calling,”  
20 are more likely to separate from employment matches. Hence, our model correctly predicts  
21 that age differences in unemployment rates are due to age differences in separation rates.  
22 Our calibrated model does a very good job at quantitatively replicating the age differences  
23 in unemployment and separation rates observed in U.S. data. Moreover, labor force ag-  
24 ing in our model accounts for a significant fraction of the fall in aggregate unemployment  
25 observed in the past 35 years. Finally, once augmented with the possibility occupational dis-  
26 placement, the model is consistent with several salient facts, namely that displaced workers  
27 who switch occupation experience large, persistent wage losses upon reemployment and that  
28 these individuals tend to experience several unemployment spells following a displacement.  
29 In addition, the extended model produces a life-cycle profile of occupational mobility that  
30 closely matches the U.S. data.

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# Online Appendices

## A Distribution of Unemployed Workers

Here we provide details on the distribution of unemployed workers across types. For notational simplicity, we begin with the laws-of-motion for employment and unemployment in steady state.<sup>34</sup> Letting  $u_1$  denote the number of unemployed workers of type 1:

$$u_1 = (1 - \sigma) + \sigma [(1 - p(\theta))u_1 + \delta(1 - \lambda)n_{L,1}],$$

where  $n_{L,1}$  denotes the number of employed workers of type 1 learning about the current occupational fit. In general:

$$n_{L,i} = \sigma [p(\theta)u_i + (1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta)n_{L,i}],$$

for  $i = 1, \dots, M - 1$ .

The number of type  $i$  workers employed in matches of poor occupational fit is given by:

$$n_{B,i} = \sigma [(1 - \delta_{B,i})n_{B,i} + \lambda(1 - \pi_i)(1 - \delta_{B,i})n_{L,i}].$$

Here,  $\delta_{B,i} = 1$  if type  $i$  bad matches endogenously separate, and  $\delta_{B,i} = \delta$  otherwise. The number of unemployed workers of type  $i = 2, \dots, M - 1$  is given by:

$$u_i = \sigma [(1 - p(\theta))u_i + \delta_{B,i-1}n_{B,i-1} + \lambda(1 - \pi_{i-1})\delta_{B,i-1}n_{L,i-1} + (1 - \lambda)\delta n_{L,i}].$$

Finally, for type  $i = M$  workers:

$$n_M = \sigma \left[ (1 - \delta)n_M + p(\theta)u_M + \sum_{i=1}^{M-1} \lambda\pi_i(1 - \delta)n_{L,i} \right],$$

$$u_M = \sigma \left[ (1 - p(\theta))u_M + \delta n_M + \delta_{B,M-1}n_{B,M-1} + \lambda(1 - \pi_{M-1})\delta_{B,M-1}n_{L,M-1} + \delta \sum_{i=1}^{M-1} \lambda\pi_i n_{L,i} \right].$$

Given these definitions:

$$\phi_i = \frac{u_i}{\sum_{j=1}^M u_j}, \quad i = 1, \dots, M.$$

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<sup>34</sup>Out of steady state, variables on the left hand side of all equations would be denoted with a prime (').

## B Compensations

Let  $\tau$  denote the bargaining weight of workers. The compensation earned by workers in good matches solves the following problem:

$$\omega_M = \arg \max (W_M - U_M)^\tau (J_M)^{1-\tau}.$$

The solution takes the form:

$$\omega_M = \tau f_G + (1 - \tau) [z + p(\theta)\beta(W'_M - U'_M)].$$

The interpretation of this is standard. In a good match, the worker is paid a fraction,  $\tau$ , of the match output, plus a fraction,  $1 - \tau$ , of the value of unemployment. The value of unemployment consists of both the flow value,  $z$ , and the *option value* of being unemployed.

The compensation for workers who are in their  $i^{\text{th}}$  bad match solves:

$$\omega_{B,i} = \arg \max (W_{B,i} - U_{i+1})^\tau (J_{B,i})^{1-\tau}.$$

For these workers, the outside option of remaining in the match is being unemployed of type  $i + 1$ . As such:

$$\omega_{B,i} = \tau f_B + (1 - \tau) [z + p(\theta)\beta(W'_{L,i+1} - U'_{i+1})].$$

Finally, the compensation for type  $i$  workers in a learning-phase match solves:

$$\omega_{L,i} = \arg \max (W_{L,i} - U_i)^\tau (J_{L,i})^{1-\tau}.$$

For these workers, the threat point is  $U_i$ : if agreement is not reached in bargaining, they return to unemployment having not learned anything about their type. The solution for  $\omega_{L,i}$  is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{L,i} = \tau [\pi_i f_G + (1 - \pi_i) f_B] + (1 - \tau) [z + p(\theta)\beta (W'_{L,i} - U'_i)] \\ - (1 - \tau)\beta\lambda [\pi_i U'_M + (1 - \pi_i)U'_{i+1} - U'_i]. \end{aligned}$$

Relative to  $\omega_M$  and  $\omega_{B,i}$ ,  $\omega_{L,i}$  contains the term,  $\beta\lambda [\pi_i U'_M + (1 - \pi_i)U'_{i+1} - U'_i]$ , which we call the *information value*. By working in the match, the worker learns about her fit in the current occupation with probability  $\lambda$ . Conditional on learning, she learns that it is her true calling with probability  $\pi_i$ ; with complementary probability she learns that her type (when next unemployed) is  $i + 1$ . Hence, the information value is the discounted, expected gain to working and augmenting her threat point in future bargaining. Since the information value is positive, it represents a “pay cut” to the worker relative to the standard Nash bargaining solution. Because the worker has this additional incentive to work—to advance toward her true calling—she is willing to accept this pay cut in her negotiated compensation.



## C Proof of Proposition 1

We start by showing that  $U_M > U_{M-1}$ . Assume, by contradiction, that  $U_M \leq U_{M-1}$ . For notational simplicity, we focus on the case of a steady state equilibrium so that  $U'_i = U_i$ ,  $J'_i = J_i$ , etc. From the value of unemployment, we have

$$W_{L,i} - U_i = \frac{(1 - \beta)U_i}{\beta p(\theta)}, \quad i = 1 \dots M,$$

where  $W_{L,M} \equiv W_M$ . So  $U_M \leq U_{M-1}$  implies that  $W_M - U_M \leq W_{L,M-1} - U_{M-1}$ . Using equilibrium wages,

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_M - \omega_{L,M-1} &= \tau(f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) + (1 - \tau)p(\theta)\beta[(W_M - U_M) - (W_{L,M-1} - U_{M-1})] + \lambda(1 - \tau)\beta(U_M - U_{M-1}) \\ &= \tau(f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) + (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta)(U_M - U_{M-1}) + \lambda(1 - \tau)\beta(U_M - U_{M-1}) \\ &= \tau(f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) + (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_M - U_{M-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Now we can write the value of type  $M$  firm as

$$\begin{aligned} J_M &= f_G - \omega_M + \beta(1 - \delta)J_M \pm \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta)J_M \\ &= \frac{f_G - \omega_M + \beta(1 - \delta)\lambda J_M}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta)}, \end{aligned}$$

and that for type  $M - 1$  as

$$J_{L,M-1} = \frac{\bar{f}_{M-1} - \omega_{L,M-1} + \beta\lambda(1 - \delta)\pi_{M-1}J_M}{1 - \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta)},$$

where  $\bar{f}_i = \pi_i f_G + (1 - \pi_i)f_B$ . Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} &(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta))(J_M - J_{L,M-1}) \\ &= (f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) - (\omega_M - \omega_{L,M-1}) + (\beta(1 - \delta) - \beta\lambda(1 - \delta)\pi_{M-1})J_M \\ &= (f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) - (\omega_M - \omega_{L,M-1}) + \beta(1 - \delta)\lambda(1 - \pi_{M-1})J_M \\ &= (1 - \tau)(f_G - \bar{f}_{M-1}) - (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_M - U_{M-1}) + \beta(1 - \delta)\lambda(1 - \pi_{M-1})J_M, \end{aligned}$$

that is,  $J_M > J_{L,M-1}$ . This is a contradiction of Nash bargaining: since  $\tau J_M = (1 - \tau)(W_M - U_M)$  and  $\tau J_{L,M-1} = (1 - \tau)(W_{L,M-1} - U_{M-1})$ , we have

$$0 < \tau[J_M - J_{L,M-1}] = (1 - \tau)[(W_M - U_M) - (W_{L,M-1} - U_{M-1})] \leq 0.$$

The rest of the proof is by induction. Suppose that  $U_{i+1} < U_{i+2} \leq U_M$  (the weak inequality is necessary to encompass the case where  $i = M - 2$ ). By contradiction, assume that  $U_i \geq U_{i+1}$ . From the value of unemployment, we know that  $U_i \geq U_{i+1}$  implies that

$W_{L,i} - U_i \geq W_{L,i+1} - U_{i+1}$ . Using the same strategy as above, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega_{L,i+1} - \omega_{L,i} &= \tau(\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) + (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta)(U_{i+1} - U_i) \\
&\quad - (1 - \tau)\lambda\beta[\pi_{i+1}(U_M - U_{i+2}) + (U_{i+2} - U_{i+1}) - \pi_i(U_M - U_{i+1}) - (U_{i+1} - U_i)] \\
&= \tau(\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) + (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_{i+1} - U_i) \\
&\quad - (1 - \tau)\lambda\beta[(\pi_{i+1} - \pi_i)U_M + (1 - \pi_{i+1})U_{i+2}) - (1 - \pi_i)U_{i+1}].
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, the firms' value functions implies that


$$\begin{aligned}
&(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda)(1 - \delta))(J_{L,i+1} - J_{L,i}) \\
&= (\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) - (\omega_{L,i+1} - \omega_{L,i}) + (\pi_{i+1} - \pi_i)\beta\lambda(1 - \delta)J_M \\
&= (1 - \tau)(\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) - (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_{i+1} - U_i) \\
&\quad + (1 - \tau)\lambda\beta[(\pi_{i+1} - \pi_i)U_M + (1 - \pi_{i+1})U_{i+2}) - (1 - \pi_i)U_{i+1}] \\
&\geq (1 - \tau)(\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) - (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_{i+1} - U_i) \\
&\quad + (1 - \tau)\lambda\beta[(\pi_{i+1} - \pi_i)U_{i+2} + (1 - \pi_{i+1})U_{i+2}) - (1 - \pi_i)U_{i+1}] \\
&= (1 - \tau)(\bar{f}_{i+1} - \bar{f}_i) - (1 - \tau)(1 - \beta(1 - \lambda))(U_{i+1} - U_i) \\
&\quad + (1 - \tau)\lambda\beta(1 - \pi_i)(U_{i+2} - U_{i+1}) \\
&\geq 0,
\end{aligned}$$

again violating Nash Bargaining. It follows that  $U_i < U_{i+1}$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, M - 1$ .

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
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Figure 1: Occupational Mobility by Age




Notes: data from [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2008\)](#). Original data from the PSID, Retrospective Files, 1968–1980. The sample consists of male heads, non-self-employed, either employed or temporarily laid off.

Figure 2: Occupational Mobility by Age: Model



Notes: Probability of a worker switching occupations, annual frequency. This is constructed by simulating the model economy with a large number of individuals who are “interviewed” on a yearly basis, as in the PSID.

Figure 3: Occupational Mobility by Age with Displaced Workers



Notes: Probability of a worker switching occupations, annual frequency. This is constructed by simulating the model economy with a large number of individuals who are “interviewed” on a yearly basis, as in the PSID.

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Table 1: Average Unemployment Rates by Age Group

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
average (%)	10.45	6.37	4.81	4.22	4.01
normalized	2.48	1.51	1.14	1	0.95

Notes: data from the CPS, 1976:6–2012:11. The second row indicates average unemployment rates by age, relative to that of 45–54 year olds.



Table 2: Average Monthly Transition Rates by Age Group

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
<i>A. Shimer approach</i>					
unemployment exit rate	39.54	34.24	31.17	28.42	27.34
employment exit rate	5.58	2.70	1.79	1.39	1.26
<i>B. direct approach</i>					
unemployment to employment rate	28.46	26.58	25.50	23.77	21.35
employment to unemployment rate	2.62	1.51	1.13	0.96	0.84

Notes: data from the CPS, 1976:6–2012:11. All transition rates expressed as percentages. Panel A presents transition rates computed from data on stocks of employed and unemployed workers. Panel B presents transition rates computed from data on worker flows. See the main text for details.

Table 3: Rates of Occupational Change by Age Group

	Aggregate	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
<i>A. from unemployment</i>						
1-digit (%)	51.24	60.67	50.01	44.42	42.06	39.01
2-digit (%)	55.30	64.81	54.17	48.25	45.88	42.83
3-digit (%)	68.88	77.67	68.68	62.89	60.61	57.35
<i>B. from employment</i>						
1-digit (%)	3.32	5.39	3.52	3.01	2.79	2.53

Notes: data from the CPS, 1994:01–2013:11. Panel A (Panel B) reports the fraction of workers who report a different occupation across consecutive months, conditional on being unemployed (employed) in the first month, and employed in the second.

Table 4: Labor Market Statistics by Age Group: Data and Model

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
<i>A. unemployment rate</i>					
U.S. data (%)	10.45	6.37	4.81	4.22	4.01
model (%)	12.16	7.30	3.57	3.04	3.03
<i>B. separation rate</i>					
U.S. data (%)	5.58	2.70	1.79	1.39	1.26
model (%)	5.33	3.03	1.42	1.21	1.20

Notes: U.S. data from the CPS. Model statistics computed from the theoretical steady state distribution of the baseline calibration.

Table 5: Labor Market Statistics by Age Group: Robustness

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
<i>A. U.S. data</i>					
unemployment rate	10.45	6.37	4.81	4.22	4.01
separation rate	5.58	2.70	1.79	1.39	1.26
<i>B. benchmark model</i>					
unemployment rate	12.16	7.30	3.57	3.04	3.03
separation rate	5.33	3.03	1.42	1.21	1.20
<i>C. <math>M = 7</math></i>					
unemployment rate	11.71	6.10	3.99	3.91	3.91
separation rate	5.11	2.50	1.60	1.57	1.57
<i>D. <math>M = 13</math></i>					
unemployment rate	12.12	8.14	3.77	2.31	2.18
separation rate	5.31	3.41	1.51	0.91	0.86
<i>E. <math>\lambda = 1/12</math></i>					
unemployment rate	14.87	6.30	3.02	2.96	2.96
separation rate	6.72	2.59	1.20	1.17	1.17

Notes: U.S. data from the CPS. Model statistics computed from the theoretical steady state distribution for various parameter specifications.

Table 6: Labor Market Statistics by Age Group: Counterfactual

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	20–64
<i>A. 1976–2012</i>						
<i>U.S. Data</i>						
labor force share	12.90	27.90	25.88	21.01	12.31	100
unemployment rate	10.45	6.37	4.81	4.22	4.01	5.75
<i>Model</i>						
labor force share	15.68	27.29	22.65	18.79	15.59	100
unemployment rate	12.16	7.30	3.57	3.04	3.03	5.75
<i>B. 1976–1983</i>						
<i>U.S. Data</i>						
labor force share	16.77	30.50	21.69	18.27	12.78	100
unemployment rate	11.87	7.22	5.01	4.37	4.04	6.59
<i>Model</i>						
labor force share	17.77	29.23	22.47	17.27	13.27	100
unemployment rate	12.57	7.60	3.71	3.15	3.13	6.25
<i>C. 2002–2009</i>						
<i>U.S. Data</i>						
labor force share	10.95	23.75	26.05	25.16	14.10	100
unemployment rate	9.75	5.80	4.53	4.01	3.84	5.17
<i>Model</i>						
labor force share	13.29	24.80	22.59	20.58	18.74	100
unemployment rate	11.96	7.13	3.50	2.99	2.98	5.32

Notes: U.S. data from the CPS. Model statistics computed from the theoretical steady state distribution for various parameter specifications.

Table 7: Labor Market Statistics by Age Group with Displacement

	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64
<i>A. U.S. data</i>					
unemployment rate	10.45	6.37	4.81	4.22	4.01
separation rate	5.58	2.70	1.79	1.39	1.26
<i>B. benchmark model</i>					
unemployment rate	12.16	7.30	3.57	3.04	3.03
separation rate	5.33	3.03	1.42	1.21	1.20
<i>C. with occupational displacement</i>					
unemployment rate	11.08	6.86	3.95	3.63	3.63
separation rate	4.80	2.84	1.58	1.45	1.45

Notes: U.S. data from the CPS. Model statistics computed from the theoretical steady state distribution for various parameter specifications.